Abstract This paper investigates the impact of emigration on the political choice of the size of the welfare state. Mobility has two countervailing effects: the political participation effect and the tax base effect. With emigration, the composition of the constituency changes. This increases the political influence of the less mobile part of the population. But the new political majority then also has to take into account that emigration reduces tax revenues and thereby affects the feasible set of redistribution policies. We find that the direction of the total effect of migration depends on the initial income distribution in the economy. Our results also contribute to the empirical debate on the validity of the median-voter approach in cross-country studies for explaining the relation between income inequality and redistribution levels.
considers the self-interest of poorer citizens, i.e., their expectation of upwards mobility or their consideration of potential reactions of richer citizens. The second category looks at features of the political process such as the under-representation of the poor to explain the outcome of limited redistribution.
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In our paper, we focus on the first line of research. It has been strongly influenced by Meltzer and Richard (1981) who use the effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choice of citizens in a closed economy to derive a tax base effect that limits redistribution. When voting, citizens rationally take into account that their fellow citizens might substitute labor with leisure as a reaction to higher taxes. A higher tax level can thus reduce the overall tax revenue. Together with the requirement of a balanced budget this creates an upper bound for redistribution policies and constrains the net recipients' demand for a large welfare state. The migration literature has contributed a similar argument within the context of an open economy: As tax increases may prompt net contributors to a redistributive system to leave the jurisdiction, migration leads to a tax base effect similar to the one found by Meltzer and Richard. The net recipients rationally take into account that the proportion of net contributors shrinks with higher tax rates. This limits their demand for more redistribution. Yet, when we consider the effects of migration, the tax base effect is not the only factor that influences the political decision.
The contribution of our paper is to identify two separate effects of mobility on the size of the welfare state within a political economy setup and to analyze their interaction. These are related to the two different roles of citizens: one as taxpayers and the other as voters. First, if taxpayers leave a jurisdiction, migration lets the tax base shrink leading to the tax base effect as described above. Second, with mobility, also the composition of the constituency that decides on redistributive policies changes. As some groups of voters emigrate, the political influence of the less mobile groups in the population increases. This shifts the political majority and therefore the preferred policy of the constituency. For example, if net contributors emigrate disproportionately more, ceteris paribus, the political majority prefers a higher level of redistribution. The political participation effect then works in the direction opposite to the tax base effect and increases the equilibrium size of the welfare state. The literature so far has not explicitly discussed the interaction of both effects. In our median-voter model, we investigate how each of them shapes the redistribution outcome in political equilibrium. Thereby, we assess the overall impact of migration on the political choice of the size of the welfare state.
We find that the direction of the total effect of migration depends on the initial income distribution in the economy. The more equal the distribution, the more the political participation effect dominates, while the tax base effect is more important for distributions which are more skewed to the right.
The setup of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the related literature. We then set out the basic model in Section 3. In Section 4, we derive the total effect of migration on the size of the welfare state and discuss some examples for illustration. Section 5 concludes.
